A smaller footprint.
An honest promise.
Privmage is built to keep the content of your shares out of our hands.
Your browser holds the secret.
Images are processed on your device to remove source metadata. Image bytes and messages are encrypted together with a fresh, random AES-256-GCM key. Our storage receives only ciphertext. The key stays after the # in your link; that part is not sent in ordinary HTTP requests.
One reveal means one attempt.
Opening a link or its messaging preview does not reveal anything. Pressing Reveal atomically claims it. Only one request can win. Before we send back ciphertext, we permanently mark it consumed and attempt to delete it. Failed deletions are queued for retry. Failed or interrupted reveals never reopen the secret.
Unopened shares have an ending, too.
Links expire after the period chosen by the sender. Expired content cannot be claimed. A scheduled cleanup deletes expired and abandoned encrypted objects; physical deletion may lag expiry. A short-lived upload permission can temporarily recreate a deleted encrypted object, so cleanup checks again after that permission expires.
While the sender’s confirmation page is open, they can revoke the link. A separate sender permission stays only in that tab and is never included in the recipient’s link. Revocation prevents a new reveal; it cannot erase a recipient’s existing view or undo a claim that has already started.
What this can’t protect.
Anyone holding the full link can claim it. We cannot verify the intended recipient. A recipient can photograph, screenshot, record or extract what they can view. Right-click and printing deterrents are convenience measures, not DRM.
A compromised browser, device, extension, hosting provider, or changed application code can defeat browser encryption. Use a service you trust, send links through a trusted channel, and verify the origin. JavaScript memory and browser history cannot be securely erased with absolute guarantees.
No analytics. No accounts.
We use no analytics, session replay, tracking cookies, or browser storage for secrets. To limit abuse, short-lived rate counters use rotating keyed hashes of network addresses. Raw addresses are not stored by application code. Infrastructure providers may process request metadata according to their own policies. Ciphertext length, share timing and access patterns are observable.
The complete link also holds a separate random reveal permission. Your browser sends that permission only when you press Reveal. It cannot decrypt the content, and knowing only the link’s path is not enough to claim it.
Less metadata, deliberately.
The application stores random identifiers, opaque storage paths, timestamps, ciphertext size, capability hashes and state. It does not store your original filename, message, image type, key or content hash. PNG remains PNG; JPEG and WebP are re-encoded at high quality. Animated images are flattened to a still frame. Metadata removal can change color rendering and involves lossy re-encoding for JPEG and WebP.
Copying is discouraged, but screenshots cannot be technically prevented by a normal website.